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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3544 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JONATHAN PAUL WIKTORCHIK, JR. 
                                                 Appellant 
 
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 2-10-cr-00064-001) 
District Judges:  Honorable Robert F. Kelly 
      
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1 (a) 
on May 21, 2013 
 
(Filed: May 23, 2013) 
 
Before:  RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR. and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
   
 
O P I N I O N  
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 In this appeal, Defendant Jonathan Paul Wiktorchik, Jr. urges that he is entitled to 
a new trial because the District Court improperly admitted evidence of a prior felony 
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conviction.  No objection was raised to the admission of this evidence, and we find no 
error, let alone plain error.  Accordingly, we will affirm.  
I.  Background 
On March 30, 2008, at approximately 2:54 a.m., a fire destroyed the Mountain 
View Plaza located in Ottsville, Bucks County, Pennsylvania.  The plaza consisted of two 
separate buildings occupied by five small businesses, one of which – Bucks Chiropractic 
Center – was owned by Wiktorchik.  An investigation into the cause and origin of the fire 
was launched by the Pennsylvania State Police and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (ATF).  By May 29, 2008, ATF Special Agents had conducted 
three interviews with Wiktorchik; Wiktorchik changed his story each time. Wiktorchik 
did indicate in his first interview that he planned to sell his practice and had listed it with 
two real estate agencies, but no one had offered to purchase it.  Subsequently, 
investigators executed a search warrant at his residence where they seized two empty 
five-gallon cans of gasoline, two computers, and numerous financial records.  
In an incident separate from the fire, in June 2007, Wiktorchik had been convicted 
of insurance fraud in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas. Wiktorchik‟s 
chiropractic license was suspended in January 2008 as a result of his conviction.  
An audit of Wiktorchik‟s financial records revealed that his income generated 
from patient fees dropped from $28,312 in January 2007 to $9,399 by December of 2007 
and to $8,415 by March 2008. Wiktorchik‟s bank statements and a net cash flow analysis 
showed similar declines in total revenue and cash flow from June 2007 to March 2008.  
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Wiktorchik and his wife maintained a $212,000 fire insurance policy with Zurich 
North America, which included additional areas of coverage beyond the basic $212,000 
policy.  After the fire, Zurich launched its own investigation and hired a forensic 
accountant to review the claim and documents submitted by Wiktorchik.  During the 
investigation, Zurich‟s accountant asked Wiktorchik about the significant drop in 
revenue, and Wiktorchik admitted that his conviction had negatively affected his practice.  
On February 4, 2010, a grand jury returned a seven-count indictment against 
Wiktorchik, charging him with malicious damage by means of fire of a building used in 
interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 884(i), use of fire to commit a felony, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h), mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, three counts 
of making false statements to the government, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and 
interfering with administration of IRS law, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a).  
Wiktorchik proceeded to trial in March 2011.  At trial, the government presented 
evidence regarding Wiktorchik‟s financial situation, showing his significant decline in 
income after his 2007 conviction and 2008 license suspension. The government also 
elicited testimony from two witnesses – ATF Agent Jesse Lampf and Phillip Moretti of 
Zurich Insurance – regarding Wiktorchik‟s previous felony conviction.  Lampf testified 
that Wiktorchik had admitted in their first interview that he had been convicted of a state 
felony offense in 2007.  Moretti testified that he was aware before his second meeting 
with Wiktorchik that Wiktorchik had a felony conviction, and Wiktorchik admitted this 
during their meeting.  Finally, Wiktorchik, who testified on his own behalf at trial, 
admitted on cross-examination that he was convicted of a felony in 2007 and that his 
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chiropractic license had been suspended in January 20008.  The government elicited this 
testimony without identifying the offense of conviction or eliciting any further details 
about the conviction. 
The jury found Wiktorchik guilty of all counts, except interference with the 
administration of IRS law.  The District Court subsequently sentenced Wiktorchik to 204 
months of imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised release.  Additionally, the 
District Court ordered Wiktorchik to pay $1,585,012.84 in restitution and a $600 special 
assessment. 
The instant appeal followed.
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II.  Discussion 
On appeal Wiktorchik argues that the District Court erroneously admitted 
testimonial evidence of a prior felony conviction in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 
404(b) and that this unduly prejudiced the outcome of his case.  He specifically calls into 
question the admission of testimony by Lampf and Moretti, both of whom referenced 
Wiktorchik‟s 2007 state felony conviction.  Wiktorchik contends that the admission of 
such testimony amounted to the erroneous introduction of propensity evidence, thus 
entitling him to a new trial.  For the reasons stated below, we disagree.  
 Because Wiktorchik did not object to the District Court admitting evidence of his 
2007 felony conviction at trial, we review Wiktorchik‟s claim for plain error.  Puckett v. 
                                              
1
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134-35 (2009).
2
   For Wiktorchick to prevail on plain error 
review, he must demonstrate “(1) there is an „error‟; (2) the error is „clear or obvious, 
rather than subject to reasonable dispute‟; (3) the error „affected the appellant‟s 
substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means‟ it „affected the outcome of the 
district court proceedings‟; and (4) „the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings.‟”  United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, --, 
130 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2010) (quoting Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135).  
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides in relevant part that: “Evidence of a 
crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person‟s character in order to show 
that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”  Fed. R. 
Evid. 404(b)(1).  However, “[t]his evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such 
as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of 
mistake, or lack of accident.”  Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).  
“We have recognized that Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion rather than of 
exclusion.”  United States v. Jemal, 26 F.3d 1267, 1272 (3d Cir. 1994); see also United 
States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 766 (3d Cir. 1978) (finding draftsmen of 404(b) intended to 
“emphasize [the] admissibility of „other crime‟ evidence”).  And we favor the admission 
of other criminal conduct if such evidence is “„relevant for any purpose other than to 
show a mere propensity or disposition on the part of the defendant to commit the crime.‟”  
                                              
2
 Failing to abide by the contemporaneous-objection rule ordinarily precludes raising an 
unpreserved claim of trial error on appeal, see United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 n.12 
(1985); however, Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure recognizes a limited 
exception to that preclusion in the form of plain error review, Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. 
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Id. at 765 (quoting United States v. Stirone, 262 F.2d 571, 576 (3d Cir. 1958), rev’d on 
other grounds 361 U.S. 212 (1960)).  
 While Wiktorchik argues that the testimonial evidence was nothing more than 
propensity evidence, the record reveals that the testimony aided the government in 
establishing Wiktorchik‟s motive for the arson, and helped complete the story of the 
crime for the jury.  The evidence was important to the government in establishing 
Wiktorchik‟s motive as it explained why his finances declined after June 2007 and why 
his license to practice was suspended in 2008 – both consequences of his conviction.  
This allowed the government to prove Wiktorchik‟s dire financial circumstances resulting 
from his prior conviction in order to successfully establish motive.  Thus, the government 
presented this evidence to “complete the story” of the crime for the jury, United States v. 
Green, 617 F.3d 233, 247-48, 248 n.14 (3d Cir. 2010), and the evidence aided, rather 
than improperly influenced, the jury‟s decision.   
Wiktorchik also contends that the admission of the record of his prior conviction 
was unnecessary because the government had “ample other indicia of [his] involvement,” 
rendering the testimony irrelevant, and substantially more prejudicial than probative.
3
  
(Appellant Br. 24-25.)  However, by arguing that any reference to his prior conviction 
was unnecessary because the government had “ample other indicia of [his] involvement” 
even without evidence of his prior conviction, Wiktorchik acknowledges the likelihood of 
                                              
3
 The other evidence included: evidence confirming the fire originated in Wiktorchik‟s 
chiropractic center, that gasoline had been poured throughout the center and set on fire, 
Wiktorchik‟s lying about his whereabouts on the night of the fire and his injuries, the substantial 
monthly payment for equipment and office space, and Wiktorchik‟s inability to sell his practice.  
(Appellee Br. 8-9, 12-15, 18-20.) 
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his being found guilty based solely on other evidence.  Thus, Wiktorchik‟s argument 
implicitly concedes that the testimonial evidence did not affect the outcome of his trial, as 
the government had sufficient evidence to convict him even without it.  
Last, Wiktorchik argues that because the District Court did not give a limiting 
instruction until the closing charge, the testimonial evidence at issue had the effect of 
unfairly establishing that he had the propensity to commit crimes.  We have held that a 
proper limiting instruction can ameliorate possible prejudice. See United States v. Lee, 
612 F.3d 170, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding no error where court charged jury to 
consider evidence of defendant‟s gun possession charge for the limited purposes for 
which it was admitted) (citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988) 
(finding that protection against unfair prejudice comes from a jury instruction that 404(b) 
evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted)).  In 
its final charge to the jury the District Court instructed the jury that they “may not 
consider a prior conviction as evidence of guilt of the crime for which [Wiktorchik] is 
now on trial.”  (App. at 950.)  Defendant did not object to this instruction.  Because the 
District Court explicitly instructed the jury in such a manner, we cannot find any 
prejudicial effect on this ground.  See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987) 
(noting “the almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their 
instructions”). 
III.  Conclusion 
 Accordingly, we find no error, let alone plain error, in the admission of this 
evidence, and we will therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
